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April 6, 1990
The Honorable Robert A. Roe
Chairman, Committee on Science, Space,
and Technology
House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman:
As requested by your office on April 14, 1989, this report provides additional and updated
information on certain aspects of the space debris issue including (1) the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) plans for protecting the space station from
space debris, including estimates of costs and risks posed by debris to the space station;
(2) the extent and precision of current NASA and Department of Defense debris-tracking
capabilities, particularly for debris in the 1- to 10-centimeter range; and (3) the extent to
which orbital debris has affected shuttle operations.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report
earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the date of this letter. At that
time, we will send copies to appropriate congressional committees; the Administrator of
NASA; and the Secretary of Defense. We will also make copies available to other interested
parties upon request.
This work was performed under the direction of Samuel W. Bowlin, Director for Defense and
Security Information Systems, who can be reached at (202) 275-4649. Other major
contributors are listed in appendix II.
Sincerely yours,
Ralph V. Carlone
Assistant Comptroller General
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Executive Summmy
Purpose	 Experts estimate that more than 3.5 million man-made objects are orbit-ing the earth. These objects—space debris—include whole and fragmen-
tary parts of rocket bodies and other discarded equipment from space
missions. About 24,500 of these objects (those 1 centimeter or larger)
can cause catastrophic damage upon impact, and could pose a threat to
future space shuttle missions and the planned space station.
The House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology asked GAo to
review certain aspects of the space debris issue: (1) the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration's (NASA) plans for protecting the space
station from debris, (2) the extent and precision of current NASA and
Defense Department debris-tracking capabilities, and (3) the extent to
which debris has already affected shuttle operations.
Background	 Two of NASA's major efforts are the operational space shuttle and theplanned space station. NASA launches the shuttle a number of times each
year to perform such versatile missions as transporting payloads and
functioning as a research center and repair ship. The shuttle will also be
critical to the assembly and operation of the space station. Construction
of the station is planned to begin in 1995. It is expected to remain in
service for 30 years and cover an area roughly the size of a football
field. Cost estimates for the station are approaching $30 billion.
The space environment is expected to become increasingly polluted as
worldwide spacecraft launches increase and collisions between debris
particles create more debris. This becomes all the more menacing consid-
ering that a 1-centimeter aluminum sphere (roughly the diameter of an
aspirin tablet) traveling at an average speed of 22,000 miles per hour
disperses the same kinetic energy when striking a spacecraft as would a
400-pound safe traveling 60 miles per hour.
The National Security Council calculated, based on the estimated
amount of debris in space in 1988, that a spacecraft the size of the space
station would be hit by an object larger than 1 centimeter once in 20
years. The Council predicted that this possibility would increase to one
hit every 2 years by 2010. NASA and Defense contend these estimates
assume that no preventive measures to reduce debris production will
take place.
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Results In Brief	 Any plan to protect the space station from debris must hinge on NASA's
estimate of the amount of debris likely to be encountered--and the esti-
mate's accuracy, recency, and reliability. The 1984 model that NASA is
now using to design the space station significantly underestimates the
amount of debris expected by 2005. As a result, NASA is designing the
space station to meet requirements that greatly underestimate the seri-
ousness of the debris environment. NASA officials acknowledge that they
have been presented with updated data that reflect a much more severe
environment. This updated data, or revised debris model, was rejected
by the space station program director partly because of the increased
cost to the space station that would result and partly because of a need
for further analysis of the risks and hazards posed by space debris. NASA
has several efforts underway that are grappling with the space debris
environment problem. The critical date for space station design deci-
sions is July 1992.
NASA relies on Defense Department systems to track earth-orbiting
objects (on average, 10 centimeters or larger). NASA uses this information
to plan launches as well as collision-avoidance maneuvers for the shut-
tle. Although NASA began discussions with Defense in October 1989
about the requirements for collision avoidance tracking for the station,
no such requirement has yet been established.
Shuttle operations to a minor extent have been affected by space debris.
Evidence points to one and possibly two shuttles having been struck by
debris. Although the damage was not life-threatening, such strikes do
underscore the importance of dealing with this potentially catastrophic
problem before the station is designed and constructed.
Principal Findings
Protection From Debris
	
While NASA acknowledges that the space debris environment is much
more severe than that reflected in.its 1984 model, documents used to
guide contractors in designing the station have not been revised to
accommodate this severity. As a result, the space station is being
designed to meet requirements that underestimate the debris environ-
ment. However, NASA appears to be making good progress in revising the
1984 debris model, which will reflect the increased severity in the debris
environment. This may increase costs, but NASA does not yet know how
much. Once the debris environment is revised, it will provide a basis for
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debris cost, risk, and hazard assessments which will be used to help
decide how NASA should protect the space station. These assessments
were planned but had not been initiated when GAo completed its work.
NASA is considering a combination of protective techniques, including (1)
shielding the station against small particles, (2) an emergency warning
system to alert the crew of potential impact with debris large enough to
cause serious damage but too small to track or avoid, and (3) designing
the station to move away from large objects. However, NASA cannot con-
clude which techniques will best protect the space station and its crew
until the debris environment is updated and the cost, risk, and hazard
analyses are completed. Decisions on the protection techniques must be
finalized before completion of critical design reviews in 1992, at which
time design requirements for the station are planned to be finalized.
Tracking Limitations NASA relies on the Defense-operated Space Surveillance Network of 29
radar and optical sensor sites to track space objects. Eleven of the 29
sites can track objects smaller than 10 centimeters but, as a matter of
practice, only about 3.5 percent of the objects currently tracked are
smaller. Because of uncertainties about the actual number of objects
between 1 and 10 centimeters, NASA made an agreement with the U.S.
Space Command to use a facility, called Haystack, to count and measure
objects in this size range.
Effects of Debris on	 Original hazard assessments for the shuttle did not factor in the poten-
Shuttle Operations	 tial damage from space debris, because it was not considered a signifi-
cant threat to spacecraft when the shuttle was designed. As such, the
shuttle could not shield against debris over .4 centimeters. Although
debris has never completely penetrated a shuttle surface, two windows
and possibly one tile surface have displayed evidence of being hit. After
the Challenger accident, flight rules were changed to require the shuttle
to avoid collisions with tracked debris provided (1) there is time to plan
and execute the maneuver, (2) the debris is predicted to come close to
the shuttle, and (3) the maneuver does not compromise the primary
payload or mission objectives.
During the first five shuttle missions after the new rules took effect,
Defense warned NASA eight times that tracked objects would come close
to the shuttle. Only one of these warnings called for an evasive maneu-
ver, but the maneuver was not taken because time was insufficient. No
collision occurred. Potential risks to the shuttle are expected to increase
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in the 1990s as the debris environment becomes worse and shuttle mis-
sions are planned to last as much as 4 times longer.
Recommendation	 In light of the potential catastrophic risk posed by debris to the space
station and the shuttle, GAo recommends that the Administrator, NASA
initiate and complete the needed risk, hazard, and cost analyses associ-
ated with a valid space debris estimate in time for their results to be
incorporated into the final design requirements for the space station
scheduled for 1992; and
perform a debris risk and hazard assessment for the shuttle that factors
in the anticipated increases in the debris environment and the planned
longer duration missions.
Agency Comments In commenting on a draft of this report, NASA agreed that orbital debris
was a growing problem which, if not mitigated, will become an increas-
ing threat to space operations. NASA also highlighted its efforts and those
of other space-faring nations to understand the debris environment, its
trends, and how best to deal with debris hazards.
NASA expressed concern with the overall tone of the report which,
according to NASA, suggests that it was derelict in its responsibility to
protect mission crews and valuable hardware from unnecessary risks.
GAO believes the report accurately describes the magnitude of the debris
problem and how NASA's efforts to deal with this difficult and complex
problem involve cost and safety considerations. NASA also said the report
implies that it is ignoring current debris data in designing the space sta-
tion. GAo believes the report did not imply that NASA was ignoring cur-
rent space debris data, but, to the contrary, stated that NASA seemed to
be making good progress in updating the current model. However, until
the contractors are required to use this model, the station continues to
be designed to meet a debris environment that NASA admits is
understated.
NASA believes it has been fully responsive to the dangers posed by debris
and meteoroids, and has performed debris risk and hazard assessments
for every manned mission since 1962. GAo disagrees. Although meteor-
oid dangers have been studied, NASA representatives confirmed that deb-
ris risk and hazard analyses have never been performed for the shuttle.
Further, at the time GAo completed its work, these analyses, although
planned, had not been initiated for the station.
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Introduction
Millions of objects, both natural and man-made, pass near or orbit the
earth at any given time. The natural objects are meteoroids (meteor par-
ticles), while the orbiting man-made objects—space debris—include
whole and fragmentary parts of rocket bodies and other discarded
equipment from space missions. Meteoroids have an average size of
about .01 centimeter—about the size of a printed period. About 440
pounds of meteoroid mass are passing near the earth at any time. In
contrast, an estimated 6.6 million pounds of man-made objects are in
orbit, including about 24,500 pieces believed to be 1 centimeter or
larger—about the size of an aspirin tablet.
Spacecraft have historically been designed for protection against mete-
oroids, which are attracted from space by earth's gravity and briefly
pass through the space around the earth before burning up when hitting
the atmosphere. Unlike meteoroids, however, space debris remains in
earth orbit during its entire lifetime. Although the debris also falls into
progressively lower orbits and normally burns up in the atmosphere, the
orbital lifetime of a piece of debris can exceed a year or more, depending
upon the mass and area of the object. For example, a glass marble in a
circular orbit at about 311 miles will stay aloft for about a year, but if it
were in orbit at 497 miles, it would stay up for 30 years. Above 559
miles, orbital lifetimes can be 500 years or more. Obviously, then, pro-
tection from space debris is an increasingly important factor in space-
craft design.
According to a 1987 publication on space debris,
"For years the meteoroid environment has driven shielding requirements, but
research conducted during the 1970s showed that the artificial debris environment
has, for the most part, become the most probable source of spacecraft damage....
Due to the orbital nature of artificial space debris, the relative velocity for a colli-
sion between an operational satellite and a piece of space debris, both in low Earth
orbit, is about 9-11 km/s [kilometers per second]. Consequently, the damage
expected from the impact of space debris is likely to be more severe than from mete-
oroids. A difference in hazards also develops because of different population sizes
and because space debris may linger in orbit for years while a given meteoroid
passes through the near Earth environment only once."'
The estimated mass of the 3.5 million man-made objects in earth orbit is
about 15,000 times larger than the mass of natural meteoroids. Man-
'Artificial Space Debris, Nicholas L. Johnson and Darren S. McKnight, Orbit Book Company, 1987, p.
68.
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made objects in orbit travel at roughly 22,000 miles per hour; a 1-centi-
meter sphere traveling at that speed disperses the same kinetic energy
when striking a spacecraft as would a 400-pound safe traveling at 60
miles per hour. The following table shows the estimated distribution of
man-made space debris, by size.
Table 1.1: Estimated Distribution of Man-
Made Space Debris 	 Number of
Object size	 objects	 Percentage	 Total mass	 Percentage
Over 10 cm	 7,000	 0.2	 6,611,595.4 Ibs	 99.97
1-10 cm	 17,500	 0.5	 2,204.6 Ibs	 0.03
Under 1 cm	 3,500,000	 99.3
Totals	 3,524,500	 100.0	 6,613,800lbs8	 100.00
Source: Report on Orbital Debris, by Interagency Group (Space), National Security Council, February
1989.
aDefense officials told us they believe that the current total mass of man-made objects in lower earth
orbit is 3 to 4 million pounds, based on a study Defense completed after the National Security Council
report was published in 1989.
On the basis of concerns about the potential implications for NASA space-
craft from space debris, the Subcommittee on Space Science and Appli-
cations, House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, conducted
hearings in July 1988. In February 1989, the Interagency Group (Space)
of the National Security Council issued a report on the space debris
problem. The Council calculated, on the basis of the estimated amount of
debris in space in 1988, that a spacecraft the size of the space station
would be hit by an object larger than 1 centimeter once in 20 years.
They predicted that this possibility would increase to one hit every 2
years by 2010. Both NASA and Defense pointed out that these collision
estimates were based on (1) the assumption that no further preventive
measures to reduce the debris production would take place, and (2) the
original estimated size of the station (5,000 square meters), as opposed
to the current planned size (2,000 square meters). NASA believes the
probability of impact will decrease as the world's space agencies initiate
debris growth mitigation actions, such as venting unused fuel from
orbiting booster stages to help reduce the possibility of explosions in
space.
The National Security Council report also explains that the effect of a
space debris impact on a spacecraft is related to the object's mass and
velocity, and that objects larger than 1 centimeter could cause cata-
strophic damage. Figure 1.1 shows the relative effects of various size
particles.
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Figure 1.1: Kinetic Energy and Debris Effects Comparisons for Collisions at 10 Km/Sec (22,369 Miles Per Hour)
Particle Size Effects
<.01 cm —	 Surface erosion
<.1 cm
—	 Possibly serious damage
.3 cm at 10 km/sec(32,630 ft/sec) —	 O	 Bowling ball at^^	 60 mph (88 ft/sec)
1 cm aluminum sphere 400 Ib. safe at
at 10 km/sec —	 60 mph (88 ft/sec)
Source: Report on Orbital Debris, by Interagency Group (Space), National Security Council, February
1989.
A NASA space debris expert believes that the danger of such collisions is
compounded by estimates that the amount of space debris will increase
by 5 percent annually for about the next 20 years, as worldwide space-
craft launch rates increase and collisions between debris particles create
more debris. Defense officials agree that the debris problem will get
worse. Although these officials could not provide a more accurate esti-
mate of the future debris environment, they believed that a 5 percent
growth rate is too high. There is concern that the growth of man-made
space debris orbiting the earth could substantially threaten the safe and
reliable operation of NAsA's future space missions. This poses a signifi-
cant problem in the design of the space station in that the station is
expected to be in orbit at a 217- to 311-mile altitude for 30 years, and,
when fully deployed, will cover an area roughly the size of a football
field.
Experts caution that much uncertainty exists in our knowledge of the
exact location, amount, and size of debris, as well as how serious the
problem will be in the future. This uncertainty is caused by factors such
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as (1) our limited ability to measure and actually validate the number
and size of particles, and (2) a lack of predictability in the number of
future space missions.
Objectives, Scope, mid On April 14, 1989, the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technol-
ogy requested that we obtain additional and updated information on cer-
Methodology	 tain aspects of the space debris issue, including (1) NASA's plans for
protecting the space station from space debris, including estimates of
costs to and risks posed by debris to the space station; (2) the extent and
precision of current NASA and Department of Defense debris-tracking
capabilities, particularly for debris in the 1- to 10-centimeter range; and
(3) the extent to which orbital debris has affected shuttle operations.
To obtain information on NASA's current debris-tracking capabilities, we
interviewed representatives of NASA's Office of Space Operations in
Washington, D.C. They provided information on the coverage and preci-
sion of current NASA radars. To obtain insights and information on the
technical capabilities and characteristics of radars, we met with repre-
sentatives of the Wallops Flight Facility at Wallops Island, Virginia.
We also met with representatives of the U.S. Space Command and Air
Force Space Command at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs,
Colorado, who provided us with information that identified the extent
and precision of Defense capabilities for tracking small debris particles.
We obtained documents describing information on radar and optical sen-
sors worldwide, including the capabilities and operation of the Defense
Department's Space Surveillance Network and the Space Surveillance
Center at Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Base.
To identify NASA's plans for protecting the space station from space deb-
ris, obtain estimates of costs or risks that NASA believes debris will have
on the space station, and gather information on the effects that space
debris has had on shuttle operations, we met with representatives of
NASA's Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology, Office of Space
Flight, and Office of Space Station, in Washington, D.C.; we also met
with representatives of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, Cali-
fornia; the Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland; and the
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas.
Views of responsible agency officials on the material contained in this
report were obtained and were incorporated where appropriate. Our
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work was performed in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards, from April 1989 through February 1990.
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NASA does not have the capability or operational mission to track space
debris. NASA does have nine sensors—all radars, located in Virginia, Cal-
ifornia, and Bermuda—that track active earth-orbiting satellites and
experimental rockets.
To track space debris, NASA must rely on Defense Department systems.
The Space Surveillance Network (SSN), operated by the Air Force, Army,
and Navy for the U.S. Space Command, is a worldwide network of 29
radar and optical sensor sites, a communications network, and an opera-
tions center with a central data processing system. The sensors collect
object observation and/or object identification data and transmit them
primarily to the Space Surveillance Center at the Cheyenne Mountain
Air Force Base in Colorado Springs. Generally speaking, Defense does
not track objects less than 10 centimeters in size.
Limitations on while all 29 ssN sensor sites can track objects larger than 10 centimeters,
Detecting and only 11 can track objects smaller than 10, and only 1 of these can trackan object as small as 1 centimeter. According to an Air Force Space Com-
Tracking Small mand official, most sensors were built to detect and track relatively
Objects' large objects (e.g., rocket bodies and reentry vehicles) to accomplish theAir Force's space surveillance and ballistic missile warning missions.
The radar frequencies and corresponding wavelengths required to
accomplish these missions are different from those required to effi-
ciently detect small objects. To detect small objects, certain radars
would have to be significantly modified—a time-consuming process that
would make the sensors unavailable for their primary missions.
The ability to detect small objects is also dependent on the sensor's beam
width and power. A sensor's beam width (area covered by the sensor's
signal at a particular altitude), combined with the amount of radar
energy the sensor is capable of distributing across the beam coverage
area, determines the sensor's ability to detect an object. Since small
objects do not return as much energy to the sensor, more energy must be
distributed throughout the beam coverage area to assure that the object
returns enough energy to be detected by the radar receiver. The larger
the beam coverage area, the more power that must be applied to detect
small objects.
'This report focuses on the limitations of radar sensors. Optical sensors, used primarily for detection
and tracking of geosynchronous earth-orbiting objects (above 22,300 miles), also have inherent
limitations. For example, weather, the object's reflectivity, and the time of observation each affect
the sensor's ability to make accurate sightings.
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One radar, known as Haystack,. is the most capable of detecting the
small objects. Even though Haystack does'not use high levels of radar
energy, it can detect small objects primarily because it operates at a
short wavelength and also because it produces a very narrow beam, and
thus a very small beam coverage area. As discussed in chapter 3, NASA is
negotiating with the U.S. Space Command for use of this radar to detect
and count objects smaller than 10 centimeters.
Tracking Frequency
	
The frequency with which individual space objects are tracked affects
the ability to accurately locate the object at some future time. Objects of
and Data Accuracy	 high interest to the U.S. Space Command (active payloads, for example)
are tracked by every sensor each time the object passes through the sen-
sor's field of view. Depending on the object, the sensor, and the type and
amount of information required, this may result in numerous observa-
tions by individual sensors on each pass. In order to accurately predict
the future position of these high-interest objects, SSN must update a
mathematical representation of the object's orbit several times a day.
Objects of less interest, however—including debris—are generally
tracked once each day. Many objects in this category are hard to track
because they are small and require more radar energy to get a return
signal, take more time to locate even when they are where they are sup-
posed to be, and are affected more by atmospheric drag and variations
in atmospheric density, which alter their orbits. As a result, some
objects are not observed at their projected location and, in effect,
become lost. Orbital data for these objects may not, then, be updated for
several days.
According to Air Force Space Command officials, the accuracy or preci-
sion of an object's position at the time an observation is made is usually
within a 3,281-foot sphere. The future position of the object is then pre-
dieted on the basis of its orbital characteristics, including inclination,
altitude, and velocity. Assuming no additional observations are made,
the accuracy of the object's predicted position at the altitude of the
space station after 24 hours is usually within about a 7.5-mile sphere of
its actual position. This is because of changes in the object's orbit caused
by atmospheric drag and orbital drift.
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Capability to Provide 	 The Air Force is not required to detect and identify all debris, nor does ithave or plan to soon acquire the capability to do so. According to AirData for Collision	 Force Space Command officials, the Air Force has not studied or
Avoidance	 approached the space debris issue from a collision-avoidance perspec-
tive. As a result, Air Force officials could not estimate the cost or
resources necessary to acquire such a capability.
The U.S. Space Command currently provides NASA with data on orbital
debris for planning launches and for collision-avoidance maneuvering
for the shuttle. The Air Force Space Command performed a study for
NASA and determined that certain elements of object location, including
altitude and orbital inclination, were accurately predicted, but that the
predictions of object velocity were much less accurate. The study noted
that velocity could not be accurately predicted because atmospheric
density and the object's orientation were constantly changing during
each orbit. Without accurate predictions of an object's location (which
requires accurately predicting its velocity), potential collisions cannot be
reliably forecast.
A U.S. Space Command official acknowledged that the existing SSN can-
not provide the detailed information needed for space station collision-
avoidance maneuvers. The SSN makes and processes between 40,000 and
50,000 space object observations a day and maintains orbital data on
about 7,0002 objects. According to this official, to constantly monitor all
objects in space would require the capability to make and process hun-
dreds of thousands of observations a day. Although the maximum track-
ing capacity of the sensors has never been determined, the U.S. Space
Command plans to stress the SSN (for Defense mission purposes) to
determine if it could make and process up to 100,000 observations per
day.
A planned replacement for the existing Space Surveillance Center would
enable it to process 100,000 observations per day and maintain orbital
data on at least 10,000 objects. This system is projected to be opera-
tional in fiscal year 1994; however, even this new system will not have
the processing ability needed to provide the data required for collision-
avoidance maneuvers for the station.
2A Defense official told us that 6,698 objects were being tracked as of January 1990. He estimated
that 220, or 3.3 percent, of these objects are smaller than 10 centimeters.
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The increasing hazard of the space debris environment could have a
serious impact on the development and cost of the space station.
Increased shielding, better tracking accuracy, collision-avoidance
maneuvering, or other advanced technologies may be necessary for the
safety of the station and its crew. These additional measures would
increase costs, although NASA does not know by how much. Critical to all
of these activities, however, is an up-to-date, reliable estimate of the
debris environment that can be expected over the next 20 years: know-
ing the extent of the threat is an essential linchpin for planning meas-
ures to cope with it.
NASA has several efforts underway that it believes will lead to a more
effective and economical strategy for protecting the station. For exam-
ple, in October 1989, NASA and U.S. Space Command representatives met
to discuss the operational support requirements for the space station,
possibly including the need for tracking objects smaller than 10 centime-
ters. NASA is also negotiating an agreement with the.Space Command to
obtain critically needed data to better define the debris environment,
including the size and amount of debris in the 1-10-centimeter range.
NASA has several efforts underway that address various aspects of deb-
ris protection, including an on-board instrument that may some day
serve as a collision-warning sensor, and alternative shielding designs
and materials that could result in significant reductions in shielding
weight.
NASA is also considering alternative design strategies for protecting the
space station from orbital debris, and it appears that the final design
may include a combination of techniques, including (1) shielding the sta-
tion to protect against some debris particles, (2) developing some type of
emergency warning system to alert the crew of debris that is large
enough to cause serious damage but too small to accurately track and
avoid, and (3) building in the capacity to move the station out of the
way of larger trackable objects. According to the director for internal
environment management for the space station, decisions on these tech-
niques will need to be made before the critical design reviews are com-
pleted in 1992.
NASA's Planned Space The Space Station Freedom is a 30-year multipurpose facility. Planned
uses of the station encompass a broad spectrum of research disciplinesStation	 including life sciences, material sciences, astrophysics, earth sciences,
planetary sciences, and commercial applications. The station will weigh
about one-half million pounds, and will be too large and heavy to be
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placed into orbit by one launch vehicle. Current planning calls for
approximately 20 shuttle flights to get all of the elements, systems, and
support equipment to low earth orbit. The total assembly process in
space will take about 4 years. Current program milestones call for the
first station element to be launched in early 1995, and for the station to
have a permanently manned capability by late 1996. Although there are
differences of opinion on space station costs, some believe station costs
will approximate $30 billion.,
Defining the	 A NASA expert on space debris at the Johnson Space Center developed a
model of the debris environment that used actual data on very large and
Environment	 very small objects and estimates the environment for debris roughly
between 1 and 10 centimeters z in size. Because the model's accuracy is
important for assessing potential damage and reflects directly on shield-
ing needs and protection techniques, NASA plans to obtain actual data on
the size and number of objects smaller than 10 centimeters before the
space station's critical design review, now set for August 1991 to July
1992. To obtain these data, NASA plans to use a ground-based radar capa-
ble of measuring debris in the 1-10-centimeter range. NASA will also learn
much about the affects of debris on spacecraft surfaces and the debris
environment after analyzing the Long Duration Exposure Facility,
which was successfully recovered from space in January 1990.
NASA considered two options for obtaining data on objects smaller than
10 centimeters. The first was to purchase its own radar system, with an
estimated cost of $24 million through fiscal year 1997. Data from this
radar would be available by October 1991. The second option was to
acquire the needed data from an existing radar facility, called Haystack,
under an agreement with the U.S. Space Command. This option is esti-
mated to cost about $25 million. Data would reportedly be available in
fiscal year 1990. NASA officials believe that performance and long-term
requirements could be satisfied by either option. On September 29, 1989,
NASA decided to use the Haystack facility. The decision was based pri-
marily on the speed of data availability.
,Transition Series: NASA Issues (GAO/OCG-89-15TR).
ZData for objects in this range have not been validated by physical evidence of debris impact on
spacecraft.
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Proposed Revisions to Significant changes in the debris environment have been noted since the
NASA's Definition of original model was approved in 1984. However, the official documentsthat guide contractors in developing the appropriate shielding for the
the Debris station have not yet been revised to reflect these changes. As such, sev-
Environment Still eral NASA engineers feel that the space station is being designed to meet
Pending requirements that greatly underestimate the seriousness of the debrisenvironment.
One NASA document, entitled Program Natural Environment Definition
for Design, defines the natural environment requirements for the design
of the space station. The natural environment includes meteoroids and
space debris, neutral atmosphere, and magnetic fields. On December 14,
1988, the director for internal environment management for the space
station submitted a formal request to the space station program director
suggesting technical changes to the document. One major technical
change called for updating the orbital debris model upon which design
requirements are based. This revised model would increase, approxi-
mately tenfold, the amount of debris expected by the year 2005. This
change would affect the performance, safety, reliability, maintainabil-
ity, flight operations, mass properties, payloads, weight, and test and
verification of the space station.
On April 5, 1989, the space station control board met to discuss the pro-
posed changes. According to the minutes of this meeting, the space sta-
tion program director reviewed the proposed changes and rejected them.
Why? On the basis that they mixed environment specifications with
space station design requirements, which in effect increased program
costs, even though a thorough cost/risk tradeoff analysis had not been
performed. In addition, the director stated that the space station pro-
gram could not fund the proposed redefinition of the space debris envi-
ronment. Two engineers who attended the meeting told us that they
interpreted the director's comments to mean that "the changed debris
environment would result in design modifications that NASA could not
afford."
According to a NASA space station program representative, the individ-
ual NASA centers that reviewed the proposed changes supported the new
environment definition, which reflected an increased severity in the
space debris problem. A senior NASA engineer voiced his opinion that
NASA is wasting time, money, and resources by developing the station to
meet understated design requirements. Further, in commenting on pro-
posed changes to the debris protection requirements, experts at one NASA
facility commented:
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"the driving function for the reliability/safety for the Space Station is currently an
externally imposed number for the likelihood of failure. This process is flawed at
the outset and will not achieve the desired results—namely a valid protection
scheme for the Space Station and its crew and a realistic assessment of the risks
involved."
These experts also believe that a bottom-up assessment of the risks
involved is necessary, including a realistic evaluation of failure scena-
rios and individual component failure rates. Recognizing that it was too
early to perform such analyses in great detail, the experts nevertheless
stated that sufficient information existed to establish rudimentary esti-
mates for reliability and failure in the debris environment. These debris
risk and hazard assessments have not been initiated although experts
believe they need to be completed well in advance of final design deci-
sions scheduled for 1992. They caution that these analyses need to be
carefully planned and will take time. A JPL representative explained
that the risk analyses should be based on objective estimates of the
threat and bottom-up hazard analyses, not on the current predetermined
overall risk goal.
As a result of the April 1989 meeting, action was planned to modify the
proposed environment definition, separating requirements from defini-
tions. In February 1990 a NASA official told us that the agency was mov-
ing ahead to revise the 1984 model, which will reflect the increased
severity in the space debris environment. As a result, costs will increase,
but this official did not yet know by how much. Also agreed on at the
April 1989 meeting was the need for a plan to detail the contents of and
assign responsibility for debris risk analyses. Such a plan has been pre-
pared but as of February 1990 had not been approved by the space sta-
tion program deputy director.
Shielding The structures of pressurized elements in space typically incorporate anouter bumper to protect the inner hull from high-velocity particles. The
purpose of the outer bumper, or shield, is to fragment, melt, or vaporize
the incoming particle and spread its impact over a wider area of the
second wall. The thickness, types of materials used for the walls, and
the distance between them, as well as the angle at which the debris
strikes the walls, are key factors in determining the shield's ability to
withstand impact by objects of various sizes.
The current design requirement for the station's critical core equipment
is to have a 99.55-percent probability of experiencing no failure due to
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meteoroid or debris impact that would endanger the crew or space sta-
tion survivability for 10 years. The original and still official definition of
the debris environment calls for shielding to protect against particles as
large as .87 centimeter. However, a NASA space debris expert at Johnson
now estimates that station designers will need to shield some compo-
nents against debris as large as 1.6 centimeters, on the basis of the pend-
ing but not yet approved redefinition of the debris environment. This
particle-size estimate may increase or decrease again as the small (1-10-
centimeter) debris environment becomes better understood.
A NASA representative told us that one design assumption that needs to
be reevaluated is that no penetration by debris of any size will occur to
any pressurized component of the station. For example, this assumption
is driving a station design that will not protect the station's occupants
should penetration actually occur. They further explained that if the
assumption of no penetration changes, major design modifications may
be needed such as (1) the development of sensors that can pinpoint the
exact location and severity of penetration, and (2) the incorporation of
automated systems that would assess damage and help the crew mini-
mize losses.
Research is underway to test the effects of high-speed impact of 3-4-
centimeter debris particles on different surfaces and on different shield-
ing designs. One new type of shield being tested is an erectable, deploy-
able shield that would be sent out to absorb debris hits. Another type of
shielding material and technique has been tested that shows promise for
increasing protection while lowering the weight and cost associated with
shielding. One of the inventors of this concept told us that further
research and development of this alternative would be needed before
NASA could consider it for use on the station.
On-Board Warning
System Could Provide
Some debris particles may be too small to track by current systems but
big enough to cause serious or catastrophic damage to the station. As
stated earlier, current design guidelines require the station to be
Advance Warning for shielded to withstand the impact of debris particles up to about .87 cen-
Collisions With
Certaln Debris
timeter. (This requirement may increase to 1.6 centimeters for certain
station components if proposed revisions to the debris environment defi-
nition are approved.) The Space Command ground-based system gener-
Particles ally tracks objects of 10 centimeters or larger, with plans to use thesedata to provide timely and adequate warning. This leaves a size gap,
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however, of 9.13 centimeters between the particle size the station is cur-
rently required to be shielded against and the particle size that is cur-
rently tracked from the ground. Given the expectation that the amount
of debris will increase, and thus increase the chances of impact, an on-
orbit detection capability for the station has been proposed by several
NASA representatives.
NASA representatives see this on-orbit detection capability as having a
potential application on the space station. Under this scenario, the sen-
sor would provide advance warning that a debris particle is about to hit
the station, thus permitting the crew to take appropriate action to mini-
mize damage or loss of life. For example, advance warning of where a
particle will hit could allow time for the crew to seal off the endangered
module and move away from the probable point of impact. At the time
we completed our work, the program manager for the Debris Collision
Warning System estimated that the cost of an experiment to test the fea-
sibility of this concept was about $35-45 million, with plans to fly the
experiment on a late 1994 or early 1995 shuttle mission.
Collision-Avoidance	 In cases where shielding is not feasible, NASA may have to develop alter-
nate protection measures, such as tracking the debris and maneuveringManeuvers	 the station away from potential collisions. It is currently believed that
this would be done for objects 10 centimeters and larger. Tracking of
these large objects, currently done for the shuttle by the U.S. Space
Command, would likely continue for the station. A current design
requirement for the station is the ability to maneuver to avoid debris
collisions by increasing its speed by 5 feet per second, with 2 hours'
warning. However, maneuvering to avoid collisions will only be possible
for the station if an accurate and timely orbit determination is made for
the approaching object.
As discussed in chapter 2, U.S. Space Command representatives believe
that the SSN cannot continually track all space objects and precisely pre-
dict each orbit accurately enough to be used as a basis for planning colli-
sion-avoidance maneuvers for the station. Additionally, existing sensors
and supporting systems have not demonstrated the capability to make
or process the number of observations that might be required to provide
the precise data required for collision avoidance. NASA and U.S. Space
Command representatives are aware of this and met in October 1989 to
discuss the need for tracking and advance warning requirements for the
station. Depending on these requirements, the U.S. Space Command may
need to initiate major system enhancements, which could affect station
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costs. However, Defense officials told us that decisions about require-
ments were not resolved at the meeting. Further, Defense commented
that one major NASA concern was recognition of the exceptionally high
number of maneuvers that would be required of the station, considering
only the currently tracked objects, 10 centimeters and larger.
According to a NASA space debris expert at Johnson, the collision-avoid-
ance solution has drawbacks. He estimated that the station could be
required to move 24-36 times a year at a 186-mile altitude, and 64 times
a year at 311 miles, to avoid collisions with currently known and
tracked debris larger than 10 centimeters. This could have a substantial
impact on planned microgravity experiments, which may require a 30-.
day inactive period between maneuvers.
Decisions on Debris Detailed information on costs or risks that a more severe debris environ-
Will Affect Station ment will cause for the space station were not available when we com-pleted our work in January 1990. Decisions on design, cost, and safety
Costs tradeoffs for the space station and its ground support systems depend,in part, upon validating the amount, location, and size of debris in space
today, as well as the results of debris risk and hazard assessments.
Some of those decisions, according to NASA representatives, could result
in
increasing the shielding, and hence the cost and weight of the space sta-
tion, to withstand impact from larger debris objects;
increasing the technical capability and data processing capacity of
defense systems, and hence costs, to track debris smaller than 10 centi-
meters; and/or
accepting a higher risk of debris penetration (current specifications call
for a 99.55-percent assurance that no penetration will occur).
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The Space Shuttle 	 The space shuttle, the heart of America's Space Transportation System(STS), made its first orbital flight in April 1981. The number of yearly
shuttle missions steadily rose from two missions in 1981 to nine mis-
sions in 1985, just prior to the Challenger accident in January 1986.
Now back to flight, the shuttle performs versatile missions such as
transporting payloads, as well as functioning as a scientific platform,
research center, and repair ship. The shuttle will be essential to the
delivery into space, assembly, and operation of the space station.
Orbital debris has affected shuttle operations and may pose increased
risks for the shuttle and crew during the 1990s. Shuttle flights have
experienced suspected hits from orbital debris on tile and window sur-
faces, but no pressurized surfaces of the shuttle have ever been pene-
trated. Subsequent to the Challenger accident, flight rules were changed
to provide for emergency maneuvers to avoid potential collisions with
space objects tracked by the U.S. Space Command under certain
conditions.
NASA engineers at Johnson Space Center explained that the shuttle was
designed to protect its occupants and critical systems from hits by small
meteoroids, but not space debris. When the shuttle was designed in the
late 1960s and early 1970s, space debris was not considered a signifi-
cant space hazard. Accordingly, the original risk/hazards assessment
did not factor in orbital debris. A NASA space debris expert estimated
that the orbiter shielding, on the average, would likely prevent penetra-
tion by debris particles of about .4 centimeters or smaller. In contrast,
window surfaces are reportedly able to safely withstand hits by parti-
cles of 1.5 centimeters before loss of cabin pressure occurs. However,
windows are normally replaced if struck by objects as small as .01
centimeter.
Safety Margins May
Decrease During the
NAsA's original safety requirement for the shuttle was a 95-percent
probability that there would be no loss of critical systems due to meteor-
oid impact over an estimated program life of 500 missions. A NASA space
19905 debris expert estimated that if the 1989 space debris environment werefactored in, the total program life would drop to 185 missions at 95-
percent probability. Put another way, if the original mission life
remained constant at 500 missions, the probability would drop from 95
percent to 87 percent. This expert's understanding, however, is that
even this lower probability represents an acceptable level of risk for the
shuttle and crew.
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However, with additional debris being placed in orbit, combined with
decreases in periodic solar activity, the safety margins may decrease.
For example, solar activity affects the amount of debris orbiting the
earth. Every 11 years, high solar activity heats the earth's upper atmo-
sphere, which then expands and moves to higher altitudes. With this
heating, the upper atmosphere density increases, causing the orbits of
space objects to decay more rapidly. As a result, the debris population
decreases. However, in the time between solar peaks, solar activity
decreases. This causes the natural process of "cleansing" the environ-
ment of space debris to decline dramatically.
A NASA space debris expert added that if one factored in the expected
decreases in solar activity and the resulting changes in the density of
the earth's atmosphere, the orbital debris environment is anticipated to
be much worse by 1997, about the time the space station is planned to
become permanently manned. He estimated that to maintain the 95-per-
cent probability, total mission life would drop from 500 to only 49 mis-
sions. In contrast, if mission life remained at 500, the probability would
drop from 95 percent to about 58 percent that there would be no loss of
critical systems due to space-debris impact.
Flight Rules Changed
to Require Avoidance
Before the Challenger accident, NASA did not have a policy specifying
that evasive actions be taken to avoid space objects, even though it
received data from the U.S. Space Command on potential collisions.
Maneuvers NASA's rationale was that given the inaccuracies in the position of orbital
debris, and slight inaccuracies in the position of the shuttle, a collision-
avoidance maneuver was just as likely to move the shuttle toward the
tracked debris particle as away from it.
After the Challenger accident, all operating procedures were reassessed,
including collision avoidance. NASA performed a study of the validity of
its debris-tracking rationale and developed a procedure that takes into
consideration any potential errors in the U.S. Space Command data. Cur-
rently, the U.S. Space Command performs an analysis for the first 4 to 5
hours of a mission prior to launch and supplies the results to the NASA
flight dynamics officer in the mission control center. This prediction
basically clears the shuttle for launch. Once the shuttle is in orbit,
updated position information is sent to the U.S. Space Command for fur-
ther analysis.
If a potential collision is detected, the U.S. Space Command notifies NASA
about any object whose predicted miss distance is less than 5 kilometers
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above or below, 5 kilometers to either side, or 25 kilometers ahead or
behind the shuttle. If further analysis reveals that this distance has less-
ened to 2 kilometers above or below, 2 kilometers to either side, or 5
kilometers ahead or behind, a collision-avoidance maneuver is per-
formed, but only if the maneuver does not compromise either primary
payload or mission objectives.
As of September 1989, no collision-avoidance maneuvers had been per-
formed. For STS missions 26 through 30, U.S. Space Command warned
NASA of eight potential collisions between the shuttle and tracked space
objects. After further analysis, only one of the eight warnings required
an avoidance maneuver. However, for this case, time was inadequate
before the predicted near miss to perform the maneuver. NASA had only
about a 15 minute warning, whereas it needs at least 45 minutes to plan
and perform the maneuver. The debris did not strike the shuttle.
NASA representatives are not overly concerned about the requirement for
the shuttle to perform unscheduled maneuvers, but admitted that emer-
gency maneuvers added some additional risk, if only because such
maneuvers deviate from the approved and tested flight plans and can
potentially affect mission or payload objectives. Using today's orbital
debris environment, they estimated that about 1 flight in 12 would
require avoidance maneuvers. They estimated that by the mid-1990s,
about one flight in eight would require such maneuvers. Their calcula-
tions were based on normal missions lasting about 1 week, and did not
take into consideration the extended 16- and 28-day shuttle missions
being considered for the future.
Suspected Damage to	 A NASA representative pointed out that damage to shuttle windows andtiles can occur during launch, while in orbit, or during landing—thus
Shuttle Tile Area	 making it more difficult to pinpoint the exact time or cause of the dam-
age. A member of the NASA inspection team that first examined sTs-29
when it landed said that tile damage was noticed on the shuttle, namely,
a small 1/4-inch-wide hole, approximately 2 1/2 inches long. A NASA
expert stated that this damage did not appear similar to damage expe-
rienced during launch or landing, and thus suspected an orbital debris
impact. A core sample of the tile was analyzed and showed the presence
of silver. According to a NASA expert, the element silver is not a common
material used in constructing the orbiter, solid rocket boosters, or exter-
nal fuel tank.
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A NASA space debris expert explained that it was difficult to absolutely
confirm a.debris strike in this instance for two reasons. First, he said, it
would have been better to remove the entire tile instead of taking a
small core sample or scraping. This would have permitted more thor-
ough analysis of the impact area surrounding the hole. Second, the
instrument that removed the sample may have contaminated the sample
and affected the laboratory analysis.
Damage to Orbiter	 windows also can be damaged during all flight phases. A NASA reportcovering the first 30 missions showed that there had been damage to 27Windows
	 windows on 18 shuttle flights. This damage appears as small pits,
bruisers, or hazing. NASA has replaced 13 of these windows. Except for
damage to one overhead window, all damage was either to front, middle,
or side windows.
Because of the difficulty in determining the exact time that damage
occurred, plus the fact that the chemical and physical analysis of any
suspected damage requires the window to be removed and destroyed—
an expensive and time-consuming process—NASA does not know pre-
cisely how many of the windows were damaged by orbital debris strikes
as opposed to, ascent or landing strikes. However, a pit was noted on an
sTs-7 window that experts have concluded was caused by orbital debris.
This conclusion was reached on the basis of detailed chemical and physi-
cal analyses. The damage was believed to have been caused by a paint
chip. On a more recent flight, STs-30, a pit was noted to a right side win-
dow that, absent a chemical analysis, experts concluded was caused by a
high-velocity impact, which could have been a natural meteoroid or
man-made space debris.
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The growth of man-made space debris orbiting the earth could substan-
tially threaten the safe and reliable operations of NASA's space missions.
Even collisions with debris of 1 centimeter in size could have disastrous
effects upon spacecraft and crew. The space station would be at particu-
lar risk from debris impact because of its size and the duration of its
mission. Additionally, the risk to the shuttle is compounded by the
length of missions necessary to construct the station in space.
Significant changes in the amount of debris have been noted since NASA
first approved a model of the debris environment in 1984. Although
NASA representatives agree that the environment is much more severe
than depicted in 1984, the documents that guide contractors in develop-
ing the appropriate shielding for the station are outdated and have not
been revised to reflect this severity. As such, the space station is being
designed to meet requirements that greatly underestimate the serious-
ness of the debris environment. However, NASA appears to be making
good progress in revising the 1984 debris model to reflect the increased
severity in the environment.
Further, although NASA is considering various protection techniques to
safeguard the station and its crew from debris, it has not yet initiated
the necessary risk, hazard, and cost analyses that will be needed to sup-
port design decisions on these techniques. NASA cannot conclude which
techniques will best protect the space station and its crew until these
analyses are completed. These analyses will take time and may involve
additional research and development of technologies including shielding
and debris detection and tracking. Moreover, time is running out. If the
results of these analyses are to have an impact on design decisions
scheduled to be made final by July 1992, they must be initiated soon.
Waiting too long could ultimately delay the scheduled final design deci-
sions, limit the options for dealing with the debris hazard, or require
expensive design changes.
When the shuttle was designed, space debris was not considered a sig-
nificant space hazard. Accordingly, the original risk/hazards assessment
did not factor in orbital debris. Although NASA experts feel that the shut-
tle currently faces an acceptable level of risk, this may not be true in the
future, when the shuttle undergoes longer missions to construct the
space station. If these risks are to be understood and anticipated, a risk/
hazards assessment for the shuttle that factors in the new debris envi-
ronment should be performed.
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Recommendations
	
We recommend that the Administrator, NASA,
initiate and complete the needed risk, hazard, and cost analyses associ-
ated with a valid space debris estimate in time for their results to be
incorporated into the final design requirements for the space station
scheduled for 1992; and
perform a risk/hazards assessment for the shuttle that factors in the
anticipated debris environment and longer duration missions.
Agency Comments and Commenting on a draft of our report, NASA agreed that orbital debris is agrowing; problem which, if not mitigated, will become an increasingOur Evaluation	 threat to space operations. NASA also summarized and highlighted its
considerable efforts along with those of other major space-faring
nations to understand the debris environment, its trends, and how best
to deal with the hazards posed by debris. The information NASA provided
in this regard can be found in its written comments on our report in
appendix L
NASA expressed concern with the overall tone of the report which,
according to NASA, suggests that it was derelict in its responsibility to
protect mission crews and valuable hardware from unnecessary risks
arising from space debris. We did not imply that NASA has ignored the
risk posed by space debris. We believe our report fairly and accurately
describes the magnitude of the debris problem and how NASA's efforts to
deal with this difficult and complex problem involve cost and safety
considerations.
NASA believes that our report implied that it is ignoring the current deb-
ris data in designing the space station. Our report notes that NASA is in
fact currently designing the station to meet requirements that signifi-
cantly underestimate—by NASA's admission—the debris environment
that the station will encounter. However, we also clearly point out that
NASA is not ignoring the current debris data, but, to the contrary, that
NASA seems to be making good progress in updating the 1984 debris
model so that it can feed into design decisions for the station.
Regarding the shuttle, NASA feels our report implies that it might take
unjustified risks in future shuttle flights. We disagree. Although we
believe NASA needs to reevaluate the future risks to the shuttle and crew
considering the projected growth of space debris, we believe our report
does not suggest neglect, but accurately describes NASA's development of
the shuttle in a time when debris was not considered a serious threat, to
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the mid-1990s, when debris may pose increased risks during extended
missions or while building and servicing the space station.
NASA also believes that it is fully responsive to the dangers posed by
debris and meteoroids and has performed debris risk and hazard assess-
ments for every manned mission since 1962. To support this assertion
for the shuttle, a NASA official gave us a 1988 structural analysis' for the
orbiter. We disagree with NASA's contentions for the shuttle. On the basis
of repeated discussions with knowledgeable senior NASA engineers, space
debris was not factored into the risk and hazard analyses that were per-
formed for the shuttle. Further, the 1988 analysis NASA gave us only
discussed meteoroid risks and hazards—not space debris. The study
concluded that on a "per mission basis" the meteoroid hazard to the
orbiter was small. However, the study also concluded that given the
number of orbiters in the fleet, combined with the number of missions
for each orbiter, the meteoroid hazard to the orbiters is significant. In
addition, as of February 1990, although NASA told us that a debris risk
analysis plan had been prepared for the station, it had not been
approved by the space station program deputy director.
NASA said its efforts have been intensified during the past few years for
the Space Station Freedom because it is a large structure with a long
mission, and because of the increasing debris population. NASA feels that
the space station program is, and has been, paying serious attention to
how best to deal with the future hazards posed by space debris. NASA
specifically stated that the program is not designing to an incorrect
requirement that will result in endangering the mission. We believe our
report gives NASA ample credit for paying attention to how to best deal
with the debris environment, and discusses NASA's ongoing efforts to
protect the station and its crew from debris. However, our work did
show that certain requirements may need to be reevaluated. For
instance, the design assumption that "no penetration by debris of any
size will occur to any pressurized component of the station" may need to
be reevaluated because, according to NASA engineers, it is driving a sta-
tion design that will not protect the station's occupants should penetra-
tion actually occur. Detailed comments made by NASA about this report
are included in appendix I.
1 0V-103 Structural Analysis for 6.0 Loads, Volume 18-Miscellaneous Structure, April 1988.
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NASA
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Washington, D.C.
20546
Office of the Administrator^^
Mr. Ralph V. Carlone
Assistant Comptroller General
of the United States
General Accounting Office
Washington, DC 20548
Dear Mr. Carlone:
Thank you for your January 22, 1990, letter soliciting NASA's
comments on the draft GAO report entitled SPACE PROGRAM: Space
Debris a Potential Threat to Space Station and Shuttle. We agree
that orbital debris is a growing problem which, if not mitigated,
will become an increasing threat to our operations in space.
NASA and other agencies of the U.S. Government are devoting
increasing effort and resources to improve understanding of the
debris environment, the risks it poses to safe operations in
space, and the appropriate technical responses to mitigate those
risks. We are actively working with the other major space-faring
nations to ensure their involvement and support in this effort.
We are concerned with the overall tone of the GAO report,
which suggests that NASA is derelict in its responsibility to
protect mission crews and valuable hardware from unnecessary
risks arising as a result of space debris. The implication that
NASA is ignoring current debris data in designing Space Station
Freedom, and might take unjustified risks in future Space Shuttle
flights, indicates a misunderstanding of NASA's design and
operation analyses and procedures. Fully responsive to the
dangers posed by man-made space debris and meteoroids, debris
hazard and risk assessments have been accomplished for every
manned mission since 1962, when they were done for the Gemini
program. Spacecraft design and mission operations have
appropriately reflected these assessments in establishing high
probabilities of mission success.
NASA has devoted a considerable effort over the years toward
understanding the orbital debris environment and its trends. A
comprehensive debris characterization program has embraced a
systematic accumulation of debris data from all available sources
and generation of mathematical models describing the debris
environment„ The mathematical models provide population
densities as a function of orbital altitude, debris particle
size, and future time. Debris data have been obtained from
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radars, optical telescopes, and material returned from space.
Because of detection limitations, observation data inputs from
these sources to the models have been limited. Thus, the lack of
data on small objects necessitates reliance on modeling of
breakup events, which are a major contributor to the small
debris population. Therefore, considerable effort has been
devoted to the study of breakups (explosions and collisions) in
detail, both experimentally and theoretically, in order to be
able to develop a model of the small debris environment.
Periodically, as new data have been obtained, the
mathematical models have been updated. The current 1984 model,
being used for spacecraft design, has been updated as a result of
obtaining new data (both radar and optical). This 1988 update is
being used for hazard and risk analyses, but not yet for
spacecraft design, because it has the same large degree of
uncertainty (factor of 2-5 times) as the previous model. The
baseline will be changed to include system design also when
sufficient data are obtained from LDEF and from operation of the
Haystack radar to decrease the uncertainty factor, resulting in a
greater confidence in the model and an associated change in the
design requirement, if required.
It is an indisputable conclusion that much more data are
needed to yield a reasonable certainty with the model. NASA has
been aggressively pursuing a program with the U.S. Space Command
to obtain the data needed on the debris environment, with
reasonable error margin., Then Space Station Freedom can use the
data to conduct a sound, well-structured, design process. NASA
and the U.S. Space Command have effected an agreement to provide
these much needed data by using the Haystack radar and a new
Haystack Auxiliary radar in the Boston, Massachusetts, area.
Information about the current debris environment is extremely
limited by the inability to effectively track objects smaller
than 10 cm in diameter. The current Space Surveillance Network
was not designed to track small particles (less than 10 cm) of
debris as part of its mission. There is a high degree of
uncertainty in our knowledge of the current orbital debris
environment and in our projections of the future environment.
Factors which contribute significantly to this uncertainty are:
(1) limited measurements; (2) a lack of accurate predictability
for the level of future space activities; (3) the indeterminate
causes of breakup events as major debris sources; and (4) the
lack of information on the degree and schedule of activities of
all space-faring nations specific to mitigating the growth of
debris generation.
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The development of improved protection techniques has
supplemented the debris characterization effort. The need for
protection from space debris has always been a design
consideration. Some missions can be planned to avoid debris-
threatening regions such as congested orbital inclinations or
altitudes, and spacecraft can be designed to minimize damage from
a debris impact (redundancy or placement of critical
components). However, the most straight-forward approach has
been, and will probably continue to be, the use of shielding.
Consequently, NASA has a significant program addressing the
development of new shielding concepts. Structures and materials
research is coupled with hypervelocity testing to provide the
necessary data with which satisfactory shielding can ba developed.
In response to the growing recognition that a more formal
mechanism needs to be established for addressing debris
considerations, efforts to define the problems and to identify
options for dealing with them have been expanded. In 1988, NASA
formed an in-house Orbital Debris Steering Group, which examines
and makes recommendations on potential activities, procedures,
and policies. This Steering Group has been involved in such
efforts as the radar program to obtain data on space debris at
Space Station Freedom altitudes to a size as small as 1 cm, the
formulation of the NASA portion of the Interagency Report on
Orbital Debris, and the component elements of the Research Plan
required by the Interagency Report.
Efforts have been intensified during the past few years for
the Space Station Freedom because it is a large structure with a
long mission life, and because of the increasing population
density of the debris, unless measures are taken to mitigate the
growth of that density. Contrary to the implications of the
draft report:, the Space Station Freedom program is, and has been,
paying serious technical and managerial attention to how best to
deal with the future hazards posed by space debris.
Specifically, the program is not designing to an incorrect
requirement that will result in endangering the mission.
During the period leading up to Preliminary Design Review,
which will be completed in about a year with the first formal
critique of the design work, the Space Station program has the
following actions underway: The Deputy Director for Program and
Operations is creating a specific focus within his office at
Reston, Virginia, for all the program activities related to
debris. Responsibility for Starting this work has been
assigned. Formal action on establishing the current best model
for projection of the debris environment is in work. Since
actual hardware design cannot be based on probabilistic estimates
of the environment with large uncertainties, sound engineering
practices require that the design teams be given a specific set
of physical design parameters. This involves specifying
protection against impact of particles of specific size,
arriving with a specified range of velocities and
directions. This specification is expected by the first
of April 1990; actual design can then proceed.
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Prior to the Critical Design Review, which is about two and
one-half years from now, NASA will study the physical evidence of
the returned LDEF mission and the data being provided by the
Haystack radar observation activities. These actual data will
allow development of the best model projections of the range of
hazards expected. In parallel, the physical test activities and
the improvement of test capabilities will be supporting the
design activities. To cope with the hazards projected by the
modeling efforts, NASA will choose a combination of built-in
initial hardware protection, enhancements of flight protection
features if future growth in hazard warrants, operational
procedures, and supporting operational capabilities. At that
time there will be a determination as to whether or not the
design features provide acceptable risk without further
modification.
NASA recognizes that the United States cannot fully address
the debris issue without the cooperation of other nations. To
that end, NASA has initiated bilateral dialogues with research
and technical institutions in other major space-faring nations,
to apprise them of current U.S, research on debris and to learn
more about their efforts in this area.
An important step along these lines in the past year has been
a series of briefings on the conclusions of the Interagency Group
(Space) Report on Orbital Debris. NASA representatives briefed
ESA and the space agencies of West Germany, France, Japan,
Canada, and the Soviet Union on the report, with particular
emphasis on those sections dealing with current U.S.
understanding of the debris environment, debris population growth
projections, and candidate measures to mitigate debris creation.
Even before the briefings, NASA had pursued a variety of
specific international cooperative activities in this field. For
example, NASA has shared its experience in redesigning the Delta
expendable launch vehicle upper stage to prevent on-orbit breakup
due to propellant explosions with ESA and the French space agency
CNES, to assist them in avoiding similar debris-producing
accidents with Ariane third stages.
Since ESA's establishment of its own Orbital Debris Working
Group over two years ago, NASA specialists have met with their
ESA counterparts at intervals to exchange information and explore
opportunities for active cooperation. NASA currently provides
the German Ministry for Research and Technology (BMFT) with U.S.
tracking data for inclusion in a comprehensive debris data base,
receiving in return a commitment for the provision of
observational data from a German radar to support U.S.
observations in the event of an on-orbit breakup event. A NASA-
ESA agreement is being pursued for increased scientific dialog
and exchange of research materials, and NASA is actively
exploring possibilities for cooperation with other major space-
farers.
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The impact rates and probabilities reflected in the GAO
report have been derived from interpretation of the Interagency
Group (IG) Report on Orbital Debris. However, the impact rates
in the IG report were based on the assumption that "no further
preventative measures will take place, and that operational
practices will not change." As described above, the world's
space agencies have recognized the significance of the space
debris issue and have already initiated some debris growth
mitigation actions. Moreover, it is reasonable to expect that
more actions will be implemented as additional attention is
focused on tlhe issue. These will very probably modify the future
trends signi:Eicantly. Hence, the probability of impact stated
for both 19813 and 2010 should be expected to decrease. The
probability of impact for the Space Station Freedom is also less
than that shown in - the GAO report, because the area of the Space
Station will be approximately 2000 square meters versus the 5000
square meters of a large space structure used in calculating the
probabilities for the cases cited in the IG report.
NASA appreciates the opportunity to clarify some of the
apparent misunderstandings mentioned above. Additionally, if you
desire, we would be glad to present a more detailed oral review
of the report at your convenience.
Sincerely,
ohn I O'Brien
Assistant Deputy Administrator
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